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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-22(3) (J)(1987 and Supp. 1991), inasmuch as this Appeal requires
the review of an order of a "court of record over which the Court
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction."

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

WHETHER THE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS

CASE CONSTITUTES A SINGLE PARCEL, GIVEN THE DEALINGS OF THE
PARTIES.

The standard of review is an independent review for

correctness, without deference to the conclusions of law entered by
the trial court.

Gate City Federal Savings & Loan Association v.

Dalton, 808 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1991); Peterson Plumbing Supply v.
Bernson. 797 P.2d 473 (Utah App. 1990).
II.

WHETHER A SHERIFF'S SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, RESULTING

FROM JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, IS GOVERNED BY THE SPECIFIC
STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

ON JUDICIAL

FORECLOSURES, INCLUDING

THE

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND ITS ORDER OF SALE, OR THE GENERAL
PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GOVERNING EXECUTION
SALES.

The standard of review is an independent review for

correctness, without deference to the statutory interpretation of
the trial court.

Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services. 813

P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111 (Utah
1991); Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
III. WHETHER THE SHERIFF'S SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
WAS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUNC PRO TUNC DEFAULT JUDGMENT
1

AND THE COURT'S ORDER OF SALE.

The standard of review is whether

the factual findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous.
Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1991) ; Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).
IV.

WHETHER APPELLANTS

HAVE ADEQUATELY

CARRIED THE

BURDEN OF PROOF NECESSARY TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE SETTING ASIDE
OF THE SHERIFF'S SALE.

The standard of review is whether the

factual findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous. Walton
v. Walton. 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1991); Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).
V.

WHETHER THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED BASED UPON

THE APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO MEET THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND THEIR FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE. The standard of review is an independent application of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure to the facts of this case. Horton
v. Gem State Mutual of Utah. 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Citations and complete reproduction of constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances, and rules, wherever appropriate,
will occur in the text of the brief.

Such provisions are also

reproduced in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Appeal arises from an Order of the Fifth Judicial
District Court, granting Appellee's Motion for Deficiency Judgment
and denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale.
2

The

issues which are pertinent to this appeal stem from the Cross-Claim
of Appellee, which Cross-Claim constituted proceedings for judicial
foreclosure of a trust deed and trust deed note*.

(RI at 15)

On the 19th day of January, 1990, a Nunc Pro Tunc Default
Judgment was entered in favor of Appellee, and against Appellants,
foreclosing a trust deed on the subject property as a note and
mortgage. (RII at 194)

Said Nunc Pro Tunc Default Judgment was

stipulated to by the Appellants, as evidenced by the approving
signature of their attorney, Stanford Nielson. (Id.)
The Fifth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Robert
L. Newey, executed an Order of Sale on November 15, 1990, in which
the Court instructed the Washington County Sheriff to sale the
foreclosed property, as described and set forth in the Nunc Pro
Tunc Default Judgment, at public auction. (RII at 236)
Said sheriff's sale was noticed up in accordance with
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and conducted on
December 21, 1990. (RII at 240-259)
At the time of the sale, Appellant Dell F. Hatch appeared
and requested that the property be sold by parcels pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated,

Section

57-1-27.

However,

said

provisions,

specifically applicable to Trustee's Sales, did not apply to the
Sheriff's sale which was being conducted pursuant to a judicial
foreclosure as a mortgage.
Appellee and his counsel, instructed the Deputy Sheriff
conducting the sale to go forward with the sale as ordered by the
Court in the Nunc Pro Tunc Default Judgment and Order of Sale,
3

selling the property as described in the Nunc Pro Tunc Default
Judgment.
The Deputy Sheriff conducted the sale in accordance with
the Court's Order of Sale, selling the property as a single parcel.
The sale resulted in purchase of the property by Appellee in the
amount of $75,000.00, as reflected in the Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale and the Real Estate Order of Sale Return. (RII at 240-259)
Thereafter, on March 4, 1991, Appellee filed a Motion for
Deficiency Judgment and for Attorney's Fees, together with a Notice
of Hearing setting hearing on this motion for March 12, 1991. (RII
at 260-269)

At the March 12, 1991, hearing, Appellant Dell F.

Hatch made his appearance, pro se, and advanced arguments based
upon Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-27, dealing with Trustee's Sales.
(RII 270-278) The Court explained to Mr. Hatch that this statutory
authority was not dispositive since the sale was a sheriff's sale
stemming from a judicial foreclosure of a trust deed.

The Court

extended Mr. Hatch ten (10) days from the date of hearing to submit
points and authorities supporting his objection.

(RII at 270)

Appellee filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on March
28, 1991, when Mr. Hatch had failed to submit any points and
authorities supporting his objection to Appellee's Motion for a
Deficiency Judgment. (RII at 279)
On April 1, 1991, Appellants, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. (RII at 282) Appellee filed a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Motion to
Set Aside Sheriff's Sale on April 8, 1991. (RII at 288)
4

After a continuance of hearing on April 24, 1991, both
the Motion

for

Deficiency

Judgment

and Motion

to

Set Aside

Sheriff's Sale came before the Court for hearing on May 14, 1991.
The Court heard arguments of counsel and testimony from Dell F.
Hatch, after which the Court concluded that the Sheriff's Sale was
a judicial foreclosure sale and not an execution sale, that the
Judgment and Order of Sale directed that the property be sold in
one parcel and not in separate parcels, that the Sheriff's Sale was
conducted in accordance with the Judgment and Order of Sale, and
that the separate parcel arguments of Appellants were never raised
in the court proceedings or prior to the date of the Sheriff's
Sale.
received

The Court also concluded that, based upon the testimony
and Appellants'

failure to produce

evidence

to the

contrary, the sale was fair and that the Appellants were not
prejudiced thereby.

Consequently, the Court granted Appellee's

Motion for Deficiency Judgment and denied Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside. (RII at 3 03 and 307)
Within 30 days after entry of the Order for Deficiency
Judgment, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal, commencing these
appellate proceedings.

(RII at 310) Other than the timely filing

of their Notice of Appeal, Appellants have been deficient or late
in meeting every other procedural rule in these proceedings. This
includes failure to file a bond for costs on appeal, as required by
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, failure to order
a transcript as required by Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, failure to file a docketing statement within
5

21 days after filing their Notice of Appeal, as required by Rule 9
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Appellant's Docketing
Statement was filed on or about August 26, 1991), and failure to
timely

file a brief, although Appellants apparently

received

approval for extension of time and for leave to file a late brief.
As of the date of Appellee's Brief, no copies of the motions or
orders for extension or the leave to file a late brief have been
received by Appellee.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Throughout all of the dealings between Appellee and

Appellants the subject property has been treated as one parcel.
This includes all dealings at the time of sale, the description in
the original Trust Deed and all four subsequent amendments to the
Trust Deed, in all court proceedings, including the Nunc Pro Tunc
Default Judgment, stipulated to by the Appellants, and the Court's
Order of Sale.

The property has never been described as anything

but one parcel and the dealings of the parties indicate that the
property should be treated as a single parcel.
II.
Sheriff's

sale

Utah's specific statutory provisions governing a
of

real

foreclosure, require

property,

that

the

resulting

Sheriff

sell

from
the

a

judicial

property

accordance with the Court's Judgment and Order of Sale.

in

These

specific provisions take precedence over the general provisions of
the Rules of Civil Procedure on execution sales, referred to by the
statute.
III. The Sheriff's sale was conducted in accordance with
6

the Nunc Pro Tunc Default Judgment the Court's Order of Sale
stemming from Appellee's judicial foreclosure of the trust deed,
IV.

Appellants

failed

to

present

evidence

or

to

otherwise show that the price received at the sale was unfair or
that they were injured by the conduct of the s<ile. Consequently,
Appellants have failed to carry the burden of proof required for
the setting aside of the Sheriff's Sale.
V.

Appellants

have

failed

to meet

the

procedural

requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as it relates
to the ordering of a transcript, the posting of a bond and timely
filing of the docketing statement and the brief.
Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence.

In addition,

Such procedural

deficiencies justify dismissal of this appeal.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS CASE CONSTITUTES A
SINGLE PARCEL, GIVEN THE DEALINGS OF THE PARTIES.
Appellee Winferd Spendlove sold a single parcel of real
property to Appellant Jodel Ventures Trust and took a security
interest in that parcel by execution of a trust deed and trust deed
note. (RI at 15) The trust deed and trust deed note described the
property as one parcel. (RI at 15)

The original trust deed note

was amended on four separate occasions, adding additional Appellants as trustors, but with no change in the description of the
property—each and every document describes the property as a
single parcel.

Appellants subsequently defaulted on the obliga7

tions under the trust deed note and its amendments, and Appellee
undertook foreclosure of the trust deed by judicial foreclosure.
Appellee is entitled, insofar as possible, to complete foreclosure
proceedings against the security in its original form.
In Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 236 P.2d 343 (Utah
1951), the Court found that even though land was described as lots
1 and 2, such a description "does not serve to make separate tracts
of an otherwise unified parcel." In that case the Court found that
although the property was described in separate parcels, it was
perceived by the parties, through their dealings, to be one parcel.
The bank prepared and accepted a mortgage of this property as one
parcel; in its' pleadings, judgment, notice of sale and throughout
the entire proceeding it was treated by the bank as one parcel of
property."

Id. at 345.

Furthermore, in Bawden and Associates v.

Smith, 646 P.2d 711, 714 (Utah 1982) (quoting Glenn on Mortgages,
vol. 1, § 88.1), the Utah Supreme Court, said,"[T]here must be as
many sales, or to put it more roughly, as many decrees, as there
are separate mortgages."
In the subject case, there has always been only one trust
deed and throughout all of the dealings between Appellee and the
Appellants, this property has been treated as one parcel.

This

includes all dealings at the time of sale, where the property was
sold as one parcel and Appellee took a trust deed and note on the
property as one parcel, in all subsequent amendments to the Trust
Deed, in all court proceedings, including the Nunc Pro Tunc Default
Judgment, stipulated to by the Appellants, and in the Court's Order
8

of Sale.

The property has never been described or treated by the

parties as anything but one parcel. In addition, the necessity for
treatment of the subject property as a single parcel is greater
than the circumstances in Commercial Bank, since the property in
this case has never been described as anything other than one
parcel.
A determination that the property involved in this case
is a single parcel is compelled by the circumstances and the
dealings of the parties and the fact that only one trust deed was
given to secure the Appellants1 obligations. Such a determination
defeats any arguments of Appellants that the property should have
been sold in separate parcels.

II.
A SHERIFF'S SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, RESULTING FROM JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, IS GOVERNED BY THE SPECIFIC STATUTORY
PROVISIONS ON JUDICIAL FORECLOSURES, INCLUDING THE JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT AND ITS ORDER OF SALE
This appeal raises no issues as to the general procedural
requirements

of notice and conduct of a

sheriff's

appearing that all such procedures were met in full.

sale, it
Appellants

only contention is that the sheriff should have sold the subject
property in parcels upon the request of Appellant Dale F. Hatch, at
the time of the sheriff's sale.

Utah Code Annotated §78-37-1

(1987), provides as follows:
There can be one action for the recovery of
any debt or the enforcement of any rights
secured solely by mortgage on real estate
which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be
9

given adjudging the amount due, with costs and
disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy
said amount and accruing costs, and directing
the sheriff to proceed and sale the same
according to the provisions of law relating to
sales on execution, and a special execution or
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose.
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth
Utah's general "provisions of law relating to sales on execution."
Rule 69(e)(3), speaking of the conduct of an execution sale, states
that "when the sale is of real property, consisting of several
known lots or parcels, they must be sold separately; . . . the
judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the order
in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such
property consists of several known lots or parcels or of articles
which can be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must
follow such directions."
In the context of a mortgage foreclosure, it is somewhat
unclear whether Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides the exclusive requirements for sales by parcels, particularly in light of the specific provisions of the Utah Code on
mortgage foreclosures.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-6

(1987),

specifically states that "[i]n all sales of real estate under
foreclosure the Court may determine the parcels and the order in
which such parcels of property shall be sold." (Emphasis added).
These provisions dictate that the Court has the specific right and
authority to determine whether the property should be sold in
parcels or in masse and to determine the order in which any parcels
10

should be sold, which is exactly what the trial court has done.
In the instant case, Appellee's mortgage foreclosure of
a trust deed

(RI at 15) , describing the property as a single

parcel, resulted in a Nunc Pro Tunc Default Judgment, approved by
Appellants and signed by the Court, in which the subject property
was described as a single parcel. (RII at 194)
trial

court

instructed

the

sheriff

that

In addition, the

"the

real

property

described in said judgment and decree of foreclosure be sold at
public auction." (RII at 237-38)

In granting Appellee his Motion

for Deficiency Judgment and in denying Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside

Sheriff's

Sale, the trial

court acknowledged

that the

Sheriff's Sale had been conducted in accordance with the Nunc Pro
Tunc Default Judgment and the Order of Sale.
Upon review of the record and the proceedings in the
trial court, it is clear that the trial court issued a Judgment of
foreclosure and an Order of Sale, and appropriately instructed the
sheriff to sell the property as a single parcel, consistent with
the description of the property in the underlying trust deed. (RI
at 15)

As a general rule, "it has been recognized that where the

mortgage or trust instrument describes the property as a single
unit, the property is subject to sale as a whole upon foreclosure."
55 Am Jur 2d Mortgages. § 653 (1971).
In order to comply with the request of Appellants, the
sheriff

would

have

been

required

to

disregard

the

specific

description of the property in the Nunc Pro Tunc Default Judgment
and violate the court's Order of Sale instructing the sheriff to
11

sell the property as described in the trust deed and Nunc Pro Tunc
Default Judgment.
It makes no sense for application of the pertinent
statutory provisions and procedural rules to lead to such a
dilemma, which
require.

is exactly what Appellants ask this Court to

However, it is recognized in the area of mortgage

foreclosures that

fl

[t]he court may give explicit instructions to

the office making the sale as to the mode and amount of mortgaged
property to be sold, in which case such direction is binding upon
the officer."
The

55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 650 (1971).
trial

court

properly

exercised

its

specified

authority under Title 78, Chapter 37, Utah Code Annotated, the
sheriff sold the property in accordance with the Judgment and Order
of Sale and the completed sale was valid and should not be set
aside.

III.
THE SHERIFF'S SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS CONDUCTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUNC PRO TUNC DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND THE
COURT'S ORDER OF SALE
As

it

relates to mortgage

foreclosures, Utah

Code

Annotated § 78-37-1 provides in pertinent part " [jJudgment shall be
given adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and
the sale of mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy
said amount and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to
proceed and sale the same according to the provisions of law
relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or order of
12

sale shall be issued for that purpose." This statute mandates that
the sheriff's sale be conducted in accordance with the Judgment of
the court and the court's instructions as set forth in the Order of
Sale.
In the instant case, the Nunc Pro Tunc Default Judgment
and the Court's Order of Sale instructed the sheriff to sell the
property as described therein, which was as one parcel. (RII at 194
and 2 36)

The Nunc Pro Tunc Default Judgment was approved by the

Appellants and their counsel without any request or other indication that a sale by separate parcels should be undertaken. (RII
at 194)

Likewise, the Court's Order of Sale was issued without

objection by the Appellants. Appellants' efforts to set aside the
Sheriff's sale came too late and are not consistent with specific
Utah statutes governing Sheriff's sales in judicial foreclosure
proceedings.
The property was sold at the Sheriff's sale as a single
parcel, just as it was described in the Trust Deed and Nunc Pro
Tunc Default Judgment and just as the Sheriff was instructed to
sell the property by the Court's Order of Sale.
IV.
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED
TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE SHERIFF'S SALE
The Utah Courts have expressed an unwillingness to set
aside sheriff's sales absent a showing by the proponent that the
sale was unfair, fraudulent, or that the proponent was otherwise
injured by the sale.

Based upon this established standard, the
13

proceedings in this case dictate that the sheriff's sale be upheld.
In Mower v. Bohmke. 337 P.2d 429 (Utah 1959) the Court
stated that "[t]he policy of the Courts is to uphold judicial sales
except when they are manifestly unfair. . . especially this is true
in a state such as Utah which has a substantial period of redemption."

Id at 55.

In addition, the Court stated that "[i]n the

instant case Defendant has presented no evidence to show that the
price was unfair or that Defendant was injured by the conduct of
this sale." Id. See also, Aetna Life Ins. v. Slack, 756 P.2d 1140
(Mont. 1988) (sale en masse, rather than parcels, not abuse where
no showing that higher price would result from sale by parcels).
See generally 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 656 (1971) (en masse sale
of mortgaged property will not be disturbed unless it is shown that
the sale was fraudulent or that the mortgagor or owner was damaged
thereby).
These same arguments apply to the instant case and the
same standard of proof is required of the Appellants, particularly
where the Appellants stipulated to the Nunc Pro Tunc Default
Judgment and raised no objections to the Court's Order of Sale
prior to the Sheriff conducting the sale.

In addition, the trial

court found that Appellants failed to present any evidence that the
price received at the sale was unfair or that they were injured by
the conduct of the sale.

14

V.
THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THI8 APPEAL BASED UPON THE APPELLANTS* FAILURE TO MEET THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND THEIR FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE.
Aside from the filing of the Notice of Appeal, Appellants
are and have been deficient in following all other rules, procedures and deadlines required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
that a bond for costs on appeal shall be filed at the time of
filing the Notice of Appeal.

As of the date of this Brief,

Appellants have not filed a bond for costs on appeal and no
supersedeas bond has been filed, despite the mandate of Rule 6 and
the existence of a Deficiency Judgment exceeding $57,000.00.

As

stated by this Court in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin,
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1984), failure to file an
appeal bond may be grounds for dismissal of an appeal in appropriate circumstances. Given Appellants1 non-compliance with the
procedural rules for appeals and the existence of a substantial
Deficiency

Judgment,

this

case

constitutes

the

"appropriate

circumstances" referred to by the Court.
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires that the Appellant request a transcript from the reporter
within ten days after the filing of the notice of appeal, or if
certain parts of the record are not to be requested, that a
certificate to that effect be filed with the trial and appellate
courts.

As of the date of this Brief, Appellcints have failed to
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request any portion of the proceedings not on file, including a
transcript from the May 14, 1991, hearing, upon which their appeal
is based and have failed to file a certificate as set forth in Rule
11(e).
It is Appellants' burden to show that the trial court
erred in its granting of Appellee's Motion for Deficiency Judgment
and its denial of Appellants' Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale.
Absent the transcript from the trial court proceedings, the record
is devoid of the arguments, testimony and evidence presented at the
hearing and the reasoning of the trial court in making its ruling.
In light of the incomplete record before the Court, it must be
presumed that the trial court's ruling was based on sufficient
facts and evidence. State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninetv-Nine
Dollars, 791 P.2d 213 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State
Mutual of Utah. 794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Sampson v.
Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App), cert, denied 776 P.2d 916 (Utah
1989). Consequently, Appellants cannot meet the burden required to
set aside the trial court's decision, particularly as it relates to
the trial court's factual finding that the Sheriff's Sale was fair
and non-prejudicial

to Appellants, upon which the applicable

standard of review is "clearly erroneous."

See supra Argument IV

and accompanying text.
In addition, Appellants have defeated one of the major
purposes of Rule 11(e), which is to avoid the Court having to
attempt a recreation of the arguments advanced by counsel during
the trial court hearing.

Guardian State Bank v. Humphreys. 762
16

P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988).
Rule 9(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires that a docketing statement be filed with the Appellate
Court within 21 days after the Notice of Appeal.

Appellants'

Notice of Appeal was filed on June 24, 1991, while their Docketing
Statement was mailed and apparently filed with the Court on or
about August 26, 1991. Consequently, Appellants were over 30 days
late in filing their Docketing Statement.
must fully comply with Rule 9."
736 P.2d 241 (Utah 1987).

"Docketing statements

Brooks v. Department of Emp. Sec. ,

Appellants have failed to fully comply

with this rule.
The foregoing facts and circumstances clearly establish
Appellants' disregard and non-compliance with the Utah Rules of
Appellate

Procedure.

Appellants

have

not

only

ignored

the

deadlines established by these rules, but have failed to undertake
certain procedures to insure the integrity and completeness of the
record and to serve the other policy concerns underlying those
procedures.

Although it might be argued that any one of Appel-

lants' abuses, taken by itself, does not warrant dismissal, the
cumulative non-compliance of Appellants supports and justifies such
a dismissal.
Furthermore, Appellants

have

failed

to marshal

the

evidence supporting the findings of the court and to demonstrate
that the findings are so lacking in support as to be clearly
erroneous. Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 794 P.2d 847 (Utah
App. 1990); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989).
17

CONCLUSION
Based

upon

the

facts of this

case, the

foregoing

arguments and application of statutes, rules and authorities,
Appellee respectfully requests that the Supreme Court of Utah
affirm the decision of the Fifth Judicial District Court, finding
the Sheriff's Sale to be valid.

In the alternative, Appellee

requests that this Court dismiss the appeal based upon the failure
of Appellants to observe the requirements of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and for Appellants' failure to marshal the
evidence relating to the trial court findings.

Additionally,

Appellee asks that the Court award Apj^llee his costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [ //^

day of February, 1992.

MI CI
HUGHE^S &
Attorneys for Apj^e
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four (4) full, true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE was placed
in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class
postage thereon fully prepaid on the / *

day of February, 1992,

addressed as follows:
Stanford Nielson
Attorney at Law
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
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ADDENDUM A:

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §§ 78-37-1 and 6 (1987)

78-37-1

JUDICIAL CODE

CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Section
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution.
78-37-2. Deficiency judgment — Execution.
78-37-3. N e c e j a r y s parties - Unrecorded
78-37-4. Sales — Disposition of surplus
moneys.
78-37-5. Sales — When debt due in installments.

Section
78-37-6. Right of redemption — Sales by parc e l s — Of land and water stock.
78-37-7 Repealed
^ 3 ^ R e s t r a i n i n g possessor from injuring
„ 7 9„ AiX P ro P ert y7 8 n 3nn
- " ' Attorney fees.

78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution.
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing
costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-1; L. 1965, ch. 172, § 1.
Cross-References. — Execution and pro-

ceedings supplemental thereto, Rule
U.R.C.P.
Trust deeds, § 57-1-19 et seq.

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

69,

78-37-6

78-37-6. Right of redemption — Sales by parcels — Of land
and water stock.
Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens
are subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions generally. In all
cases where the judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of
corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used or intended to be used, or
suitable for use, on the land, the court shall equitably apportion such water
stock to the land, or some part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it may deem
suitable for the sale thereof, and the land and water stock in each parcel shall
be sold together, and for the purpose of such sale shall be regarded as real
estate and subject to redemption as above specified. In all sales of real estate
under foreclosure the court may determine the parcels and the order in which
such parcels of property shall be sold.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-37-6.

Cross-References. — Redemption from execution sale, Rule 69(f), U.R.C.P.

ADDENDUM B:

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 69(e)(3)

Rule 69. Execution a n d proceedings supplemental thereto.
(e) Proceedings on sale of property.
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be
made at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m.
and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the
execution no more shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution
nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase
at such sale. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the sale, and it must
be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and when
the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels,
they must be sold separately; or when a portion of such real property is
claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such
portion must be thus sold. All sales of real property must be made at the
courthouse of the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is
situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the
order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such
property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can
be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such directions.

ADDENDUM C:

TRUST DEED (RI a t

15)

WHEN i

.ORUED, MAIL TO:

....S.QUIIMH..UTAH..II.T.LE..JC.QHPMY.

(.Escrow Dept.)

P. 0. Box 190
St. George, Utah 84770

Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use

TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this
between

JOELL^JF r-_HATCH__.

I?.!1.!] day of

AP.H.1

, 19....8.0

Trustee..of .the. J ^
, as TRUSTOR,

whose address is

lZ.i7..M.!.^.?.5..9r.?.y?
( S t r w t and number)

.5.?I.t 4 .Lake.City.,...Utah
<C»ty)

84.Z70
(SUU)

SOUTHERN .UTAH TITLE C W
.., as TRUSTEE,* and
WINFERD ..SPENDLOyE
_

, as BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in ...MSHING.TON
County, State of Utah:
BEGINNING a t the South 1/4 Corner o f Section 10, Township 42 South, Range 13 West,
SLB&M and running thence N o r t h along the Center S e c t i o n l i n e 1300.4 f e e t ; thence
East 666.0 f e e t ; thence South p a r a l l e l to the Center S e c t i o n l i n e 1308.40 f e e t
more o r l e s s t o the South l i n e o f s a i d Section 10; thence West along the South
l i n e o f S e c t i o n 10, 666.0 f e e t to the p o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g .
TOGETHER w i t h a l l improvements and appurtenances t h e r e u n t o b e l o n g i n g .
SUBJECT to Easements, Rights o f way and R e s t r i c t i o n s o f Record and those
e n f o r c e a b l e i n law and e q u i t y .

Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part (hereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $
//.?.""":.""
, made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
•NOTE: Tnisti'i? must bi» n member of the Utah State Oar; a bank, building nn-J loan association or^ savings
ami loan association authorized to Ho such business in Utah; a corporation 0uth0ri7.nl to do a trust business in
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.

ir..|.;L'J A

TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES:
!. T o keep said property in pood condition and repair: iml lo rcmiive or demolish ;mv building t'». reon, to
complete. t>r restore promptly and in pood and workmanlike manner any building which may In* r.Me.l i o c h \ | ,
damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply with all law-*, covenants and restrictions nflccling said properly; not
to commit or permit waste thereof; mil to commit, suffer o r permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to
do all other arts which from the character or use of said property may he reasonably necessary, the : pecific
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if t h e loan s r c u i e d hereby or a n y pa»f (hereof i; brine, obtained for the purpose of financing construction of i m p r o v e m e n t s on saiJ property. Trustor lurther agrees:
(a) T o c o m m e n c e construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b)

T o allow Beneficiary

to inspect said property a l all limes during construction.

Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, s e l l i n g forth facts showing a defaidt
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept a s true nnd conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder.
2. T o provide and maintain Insurance, of such type or types and amounts a s Beneficiary m a y require, on
the improvement* now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. S u c h insurance shall be carried
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary.
In e \ e n t of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, w h o m a y make proof of loss, and each insurance
c o m p a n y concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make p a y m e n t for such loss directly lo Brncficiary
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or a n y part thereof, "may be applied
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of
the property damaged.
3. T o deliver to, pay for nnd maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full,
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance nnd
any extensions or renewals thereof or s u p p l e m e n t s thereto.
\. T o appear in and defend a n y action or proceeding purporting to affect t h e security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or T r u s t e e elect to
also appear in or defend a n y such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and e x p e n s e s , including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable s u m incurred by Beneficiary or T r u s t e e .
5. T o pay at least 10 d a y s before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including
nil assessments upon water company stock and ail rents, assessments and chorges for water, appurtenant to or
used in connection with said property; to pay, w h e n d u e , all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest,
on said property or a n y part thereof, which at a n y t i m e appear to be prior or superior hereto; to p a y all costs,
fees, a n d expenses of this Trust.
6. Should Trustor fail to m a k e a n y p a y m e n t or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
T r u s t e e , but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, m a y : M a k e or d o t h e same in such manner anrl lo such extent as either m a y
d e e m necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or T r u s t e e being authorized lo enter upon said
property for such purposes; c o m m e n c e , appear in a n d defend a n y action or proceeding purporting lo affect t h e
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; nnd in exercising any such powers, incur a n y liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may d e e m
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and p a y h i s reasonable fees.
7. T o pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10To) per a n n u m until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby.
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
8. Should said property or a n y part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in a n y other manner, Beneficiary shall b e
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other p a y m e n t s or relief therefor, nnd shall be entitled at its option
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its o w n n a m e , a n y action or proceedings, or to make a n y compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or d a m a g e . All such compensation, awards, damages, lights
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of a n y policies of fire nnd other insurance alfeclmg said properly,
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, w h o m a y . after deducting therefrom all its e x p e n s e s , including attorney'r. fee3.
apply the same on a n y indebtedness secured hereby. T r u s t o r agrees to execute such further assignment.", of any
compensation, award, d a m a g e s , and rights of action a n d proceeds as Bcncficinry or T r u s t e e m a y require.
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, p a y m e n t of ils fees and presentation of this T r u s t Deed and the note for e n d o r s e m e n t (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation attd
retention), without affecting the liability of a n y person for the p a y m e n t of the indebtedness secured hereby,
T r u s t e e may (a) consent to the making of a n y m a p o r plot of said properly; (b) join in granting any easement or creating a n y restriction thereon; (c) join in a n y subordination or other a g t c e m e n t affecting Ihi* T m s t D e e d
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) rcconvpy, without warranty, all or a n y part of said prop.-rfy. T h e rtantcc in
any reconveyance m a y be descril>ed as "the person or persons entitled thereto", nnd the recitals therein of a n y
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these ttnsls, all
rents, issues, r o y a l t i e s and profits of the property affected by Ibis Trust Deed and nf any personal properly
located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the p a y m e n t of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the. performance of any a g r e e m e n t hereunder. T r u s t o r shall h a v e the right to collect all such tents, issues, loyalties,
and profits earned prior to default as they become d u e and payable. If Trustor shall default as afoiesaid,
Trustor's right to collect a n y of such m o n e y s shall c e a s e and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession o f . t h e property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneficiary at a n y time or from t i m e to lime to collect a n y such moneys shall not in a n y
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same.
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Bcncficinry to collect, shall be. or be construed to
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor a n assumption of liability under, nor a
subordination of the lien or charge of this T r u s t D e e d l o any such tenancy, lease or option.
11.

Upon any default by Trustor hereunder,

Beneficiary

may at

any

time

without

notice,

cither

in

by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting lo the appointment of
iierson,
Jcneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to t h e adequacy of any security for the indcbtednes«: hereby
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own n a m e sue hu or
otherwise collect said rvnts. issues, and profits, including those past d u e and unpaid, and apply the same, less
cosLs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon a n y indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary m a y determine.
12. T h e entering upon nnd taking possession of said properly, the colleclon of such rents, issues, and
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for a n y Inking or
d a m a g e of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive a n y
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate a n y act done pursuant to s u c h notice.
13. T h e failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of a n y default shall not constitute a waiver of any other
or subsequent default.
II. T i m e is of the essence hereof. U p o n default by Trustor in the p a y m e n t of a n y indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of a n y agreement hereunder, ail sums secured hereby shall immediately Iveome d u e
and payable at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default. Beneficiary m a y execute or c a u s e T m s t e e
to execute a written notice of default and of election t o cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
hereof, and T r u s t e e shall file such notice for record i n each county wherein said property or some part or

p:m»»l th«»p.»»( U situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing

!.ri. After flu* hipse of such time as may then be required by h w following (he Mn»r<!;ili<>r» i,( K-.utl nolio- »>(
dif.iult. and iK-hi" of default ami nnlu.e of sale bavin;; b«'en uivrn :*•< thru required by law. T n i s l e e . without demand
(HI Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and phiee designated itt said notin- <>l sale, either as
n whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject In ;mv •;l:ilntf»rv ri>;hl of Trustor to
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcel-;, shall he s o l d ) , nl public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price p a y a b l e in lawful money of the United S t a t e - at the time of
?nle. T h e person conducting flu? sale may, for any c a u s e ho d e e m s expedient. pnst|H>m» the sale from lime to
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, n o t i c e of postponement shall be g i \ e n by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the
s a m e manner a; the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or w a u a u l y , express or implied. T h e recitals in the
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness (heicof. Any peisoti. including Hcneficiary. may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of ( I ) the costs a w l
e x p e n s e s of exercising the power of sale a w l of the s a l e , including tho p a y m e n t of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's D e e d ;
(3) all stuns expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrueT interest at 10'/ per a n n u m from date
of expenditure: ( I ) all other sums then secured hereby; and (0) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, m a y deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. U p o n the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have Ihe option lo d e c l a r e nil s u m s
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this T r u s t Deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such a m o u n t as shall be
fixed by the court.
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee nt any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or s o m e part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. E a c h such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof m a d e , in the manner provided by law.
18. T h i s T r u s t D e e d shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind ail parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder arc joint and
several. T h e term "Beneficiary" shall m e a n the o w n e r and holder, including any pledgee, °f the note secured
hereby. In this T r u s t Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gentler includes the feminine a n d / o r
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
19. T r u s t e e accepts this Trust w h e n this Trust D e e d , d u l y executed and acknowledged, is m a d e a public
record as provided by law. T r u s t e e is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any o t h e r
T r u s t Deed or of any action or proceeding in which T r u s t o r , Beneficiary, or T r u s t e e shall be n party, u n l e s s
brought by T r u s t e e .
20.

This

Trust

Deed

shall

be construed

according

to the laws of the S t a t e of U t a h

21. T h e undersigned Trustor requests that a c o p y of any notice of default and of any
h e r e u n d e r be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore s e t forth.

notice of

sale

S i g n a t u r e of Trustor

THE JOpfL VENTURES TUR?T
BY:
'DELLTrHAKH

'Trustee

(If Trustor an Individual)
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHlNGf!)N
On the

]8.tl.l

appeared before me
the signer(s) of the
same.

day of
DEL

iApril

, A.)). J9....&Q, personally

HMCH.Tjustee.of...T]JE

t

t, who duly acknowledged to me that ..Uiey.. executed the

otary Public residing at:

•I. LANE TAIT
3

My Commission E:

St.George, Utah 04770

(If Trustor a Corporation)
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the

day of

appeared before me

,

, A.D, 19

, personally

, who being by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
of
,
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expires:

ADDENDUM D: NUNC PRO TUNC DEFAULT JUDGMENT (RII at 194)

'SO Jfirl 2LI PH 3 35

RONALD W. THOMPSON, #3242
BARBARA G. HJELLE, #459 7
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
DE;
Attorneys for Defendant Spendlove
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 673-4892

#

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CLAY T. BEESLEY and
LaJUANA BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,

NUNC PRO TUNC
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.
DELL RANSOM HATCH, DELL F.
HATCH, JOAN HATCH, JODEL VENTURES
TRUST, ENCINOSA ENTERPRISES,
BERNICE LEHMAN, COREY S. MOGELBERG,
and WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Defendants,
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
Civil No. 88-2248
CLAY T. BEESLEY and LaJUANA
BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Cross-Claimant,
vs.
JODEL VENTURES TRUST, DELL F.
HATCH, Trustee, COREY S.
MOGELBERG, BERNICE LEHMAN,
ENCINOSA ENTERPRISES, DELL HATCH,
Trustee, DELL RANSOM HATCH and
DEE SUPPLY, INC.,
Cross-Defendant.
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IN

THIS

ACTION

Cross-defendants

Jodel

Ventures

Trust, Dell F. Hatch, Corey S. Mogelberg, Bernice Lehman,
Encinosa

Enterprises,

Dell

Ransom

Hatch

and

Dee

Supply,

Inc., having been served with process and having failed to
answer Defendant Spendlove!s Third Amended Crossclaim filed
herein;

and

Cross-defendants1

default

having

been

duly

entered by the Clerk of the Court; and Defendant Spendlove
having

submitted

relief

a Motion

requested

in

for

Defendant

Default

Judgment
f

Spendlove s

for

Third

the

Amended

Crossclaim; and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that

Judgment be, and hereby is, entered against Cross-defendants
Jodel

Ventures

Trust, Dell F.

Hatch, Corey S. Mogelberg,

Bernice Lehman, Encinosa Enterprises, Dell Ransom Hatch and
Dee

Supply,

Inc.,

for

the

relief

requested

in

Defendant

Spendlovefs Third Amended Crossclaim as follows:
1.
judgment
Dell F.

Cross-claimant Winferd

against
Hatch,

Cross-defendant
Trustee,

on

Spendlove

Jodel

the

is granted

Ventures

trust

deed

Trust,

and

note

hereinafter described, in the principal sum of $76,624.45,
together with interest thereon in the sum of $23,989.58 to
and including January 5, 1990, together with such additional
interest as may accrue through the end of the month of sale,
at the rate of $20,933 per diem; together with attorney's
fees

in the

$666.25;

sum

together

of

$12,253.50

with

and

delinquent

costs

in

property

the

taxes

sum
for

of
the

years 1986 through 1989 in the sum of $4,196.66, together
with penalties and accruing interest, for a total judgment
of $117,730.44 as of January 6, 1990.
2.

The

issue

of

attorney's

fees

is to remain

open in the event that Cross-claimant Spendlove's
desires

to

additional

re-petition
costs

and

this

expenses

Court

for

incurred

on

an

award

for

Cross-claimant

Spendlove's behalf subsequent to this judgment.

M006J

counsel

3.

That certain trust deed made and executed and

between Cross-claimant Spendlove and Cross-defendants Jodel
Ventures Trust, Dell F. Hatch, Corey S. Mogelberg, Bernice
Lehman,

Encinosa

Enterprises,

Dell

Ransom

Hatch,

dated

April 18, 1980, and recorded in the office of the Washington
County

Recorder,

pages 872-874,

and

1980,

by

executed

State
the

of

Utah,

promissory

in

Book 270,

note,

dated

Jodel

Ventures

Cross-defendants

at

April 18,
Trust,

Dell F. Hatch, Corey S. Mogelberg, Bernice Lehman, Encinosa
Enterprises, Dell Ransom Hatch, for the purpose of securing
their indebtedness, as amended, constitute a good, valid,
and

first lien upon the following-described

real property

situated in Washington County, Utah, to-wit:
BEGINNING at the South 1/4 Corner of Section 10,
Township 42 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, and running thence North along the
Center Section line 1308.4 feet; thence East 666.0
feet; thence South parallel to the Center Section
line 1308.40 feet, more or less, to the South line
of said Section 10; thence West along the South
line of Section 10, 666.0 feet to the point of
beginning.
4.

The

said trust deed

and note and the

lien

thereof are hereby foreclosed as a note and mortgage.
5.

The

above-described

real property

shall be

sold by the Sheriff of Washington County in accordance with
law and the practice of this Court, and the proceeds of such
sale shall be applied first to satisfaction of the sheriff's
costs,

disbursements,

and

commissions,

and

then

to

Cross-claimant Spendlove or his attorney for the accrued and
accruing

costs

of

this

action,

then

to

Cross-claimant

f

Spendlove s attorney for the sum fixed as attorney's fees,
then

the

amount

principal,
assessments,
interest
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owing

interest,
as

set

thereon, and

to
costs

forth

Cross-claimant

Spendlove

and

expenses,

above,

together

Cross-claimant

taxes,
with

Spendlove's

for
and

accrued
accruing

costs, or so much of said sums as said proceeds will pay,
and that the surplus, if any, should be accounted for and
paid over by the Sheriff to the Clerk of this Court, subject
to this Court's further order.
6.

Any party may purchase at said sale.

7.

If a deficiency results after application of

the proceeds of said sale and foreclosure, as hereinabove
provided, then Cross-claimant Spendlove shall be entitled to
have and recover a judgment against Cross-defendants Jodel
Ventures Trust, Dell F. Hatch, Trustee, for the full amount
of said deficiency.
8.

The Sheriff

shall issue his certificate

of

f

sale to the purchaser and his Sheriff s deed to the holder
thereof upon the expiration of the period of redemption.
9.

The holder of the certificate of sale shall

receive the rents and income from the premises during the
period of redemption.
10.

The interest or lien, if any, of Plaintiffs

Beesley in and to the subject premises, except the following
described

two

subordinate

acre

parcel,

to Cross-claimant

is

inferior,
f

Spendlove s

junior

interest

and

in the

subject premises:
BEGINNING at a point on the center section line,
said point being north 0°12 f 39" East 1046.72 feet
along said center section line from the South
Quarter corner of Section 10, Township 42 South,
Range 13 West, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence South 89 0 27 f 22" East 666.00
feet parallel with the South line of the Southeast
quarter of Section 10; thence North 0°12l39ff East
parallel with center section line 130.84 feet;
thence North 89°27 f 22 n West 666.00 feet parallel
with said South section line to the center of
section line; thence South 0 o 12 ! 39 H West 130.84
feet along said center section line to the point
of beginning.
11.

The

interest

or

lien,

if

any,

of

Cross-defendants Dell F. Hatch, Corey S. Mogelberg, Bernice
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Lehman,

Encinosa

inferior,

Enterprises

junior

and

and

Dell

subordinate

Ransom
to

Hatch,

is

Cross-claimant

f

Spendlove s interest in the subject premises.
12.
let

The grantee under the Sheriff's deed shall be

into possession

of the premises

and

have all proper

process of this Court to maintain possession thereof, and,
upon issuance of said Sheriff's deed, all right, title, and
interest of Cross-defendants Jodel Ventures Trust, Dell F.
Hatch,

Corey S.

Mogelberg,

Bernice

Lehman,

Encinosa

Enterprises, Dell Ransom Hatch, and each of them, in and to
the above-described

property

shall

be

forever barred

and

foreclosed.
13.

Furthermore, in the event Plaintiffs obtain a

judgment against Defendant Spendlove, Defendant Spendlove is
enitled to a judgment to a judgment for a like amount by way
of indemnity of behalf of Spendlove against Cross-defendants
Jodel

Ventures

Trust, Dell F.

Hatch,

Corey S. Mogelberg,

Bernice Lehman, Encinosa Enterprises, Dell Ransom Hatch.
DATED this

day o f ( ^ J ^ u ^ < ^ u ^ ^

, 1990

BY THE COURT:

PHILIP EVES
district Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

St^rord/iieii^TJir^'
Attorney for Dell Ransom
Hatch, Dell F. Hatch, Joan
Hatch, Jodel Ventures Trust,
Encinosa Enterprises, Bernice
Lehman and Corey S. Mogelberg
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^/r^

day of January,

1990, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NUNC
PRO

TUNC

DEFAULT

JUDGMENT,

postage

prepaid,

to

following:
Stanford Nielson
3760 Highland Drive, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Clay & LaJuana Beesley
2085 South 700 West
Rt. 1, Box 130-4
Hurricane, Utah 84737

^
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ADDENDUM E:

ORDER OF SALE (RII a t 236)

THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Ronald W. Thompson (Bar No. 3242)
Barbara G. Hjelle (Bar No. 4597)
Michael A. Day (Bar No. 5463)
Attorney for Defendant Spendlove
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 673-4892

NOV15199G

^vfi^tlte/tkY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLAY T. BEESLEY and LaJUANA BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER OF SALE
vs.
DELL RANSOM HATCH, DELL F. HATCH, JOAN
HATCH, JODEL VENTURES TRUST, ENCINOSA
ENTERPRISES, BERNICE LEHMAN, COREY S.
MOGELBERG, and WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Defendants.

Civil No. 88-2248

WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
CLAY T. BEESLEY and LaJUANA BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Cross-Claimant,
vs.
JODEL VENTURES TRUST, DELL F. HATCH,
Trustee, COREY S. MOGELBERG, BERNICE
LEHMAN, ENCINOSA ENTERPRISES, DELL
HATCH, Trustee, DELL RANSOM HATCH and
DEE SUPPLY, INC.,
Cross-Defendant.

V * fo /</3oco 6?

2

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON
GREETINGS:

COUNTY, UTAH,

WHEREAS judgment was rendered by the above-entitled Court
in Washington County, State of Utah, on the 19th day of January,
1990, in favor of Cross-Claimant, Winferd Spendlove, and against
Cross-Defendants, Jodel Ventures Trust, Dell F. Hatch, Trustee,
Corey S. Mogelberg, Bernice Lehman, Encinosa Enterprises, Dell
Hatch, Trustee, and Dell Ranson Hatch, in the principal sum of
$76,624.45, together with interest thereon in the sum of $23,989.58
to and including January 5, 1990, together with such additional
interest as may accrue through the date of sale at the rate of
$20.93

per

day,

together

with

attorney's

fees

in the

sum

of

$12,253.50 and costs in the sum of $666.25, with the issue of
attorney's fees being left open for inclusion of additional fees
and costs incurred subsequent to judgment, together with delinquent
property taxes

for the years

1986 through

1989

in the sum of

$4,196.66, together with penalties and accruing interest, for a
total judgment of $117,730.44 as of January 6, 1990; and
WHEREAS Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was duly filed
and docketed in the Clerk's office, and a certified copy of the
said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is attached hereto and by
this reference made a part hereof; and
WHEREAS no payments have been made toward said judgment,
and the whole amount of the same is still due and owing;
IT

IS

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED

that the

real

property described in said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure be

3
sold at public auction.
NOW, THEREFORE, you, the Sheriff of Washington County,
Utah, are hereby commanded and required to proceed to notice for
sale, and to sell the premises described in said Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure and apply the proceeds of said sale as
directed in the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, and you shall
make and file your report of such sale with the Clerk of this Court
within 60 days from date of your receipt thereof, and you shall do
all things according to the terms and requirements of said Judgment
and Decree of Foreclosure, and the applicable provisions and
requirements of law.
EXECUTED this

day of November, 1990.
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ADDENDUM F:

MINUTE ENTRY, MAY 14, 1991 (RII at 303)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
CIVIL
IMINAL
1LNO:_

DIVISION

880502248

Js
DELL RANSOM HATCH
1 * X DELL F . HATCH, JOAN HATCH, e t

CLAY T BEESLEY
LAUJUANA BEESLEY
aintiff

Appeared

Defendant

ttorney

Appeared

nnp

J-

PHILIP EVES

FRK-

L. WILLIAMSON

OCEEDING:

Appeared

RONALD W. THOMPSON
BARBARA G . HJELLE
MICHAEL A. DAY
X

PRO SE

al

STANFORD NIELSON X

Attorney

Appeared

REPORTER:

PAUL G. McMULLIN

BAILIFF:

C. FLOWERS

MOTION FOR DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AND MOTION 'TO SET ASIDE SHERIFF1 S SALE
MINUTE ENTRY

MINUTE ENTRY

Mr. Day and Mr. Neilson present and

rebuttal.

Mr. Nielson heard as to Motion to Set

was a foreclosure sale not an execution

Aside Deficiency Judgment with Mr. Day-

sale and the Court directed the sale of

heard in opposition to same. Both counsel

the property in one parcel not in separate

stipulate that there is a deficiency-

parcels and the issue was never raised as

judgment and the Sheriff's sale was valid.;

to separate parcels. This issue

Mr. Dell F. Hatch sworn and testified

have been raised prior to the Sheriff sale,

under direct examination by Mr. Neilson
and no cross by Mr. Day, witness steps
down.

Counsel heard in response and

iute Book No.-

NN

.Page No..

The Court heard and stated this

should

The Court finds the sale to be fair, Motion
to Set Aside denied. Motion for Deficiency
Judgment granted, but will be held in back
nf

163

flip

for

S H^yg

.Date:.

hvfnrp

g-ignnncr Viy f h p

flrmfr

May 1 4 , 1991

proved:
3D?

